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Abstract
■ Ideomotor theory claims that actions are cognitively repre-
sented and accessed via representationsofthe sensory effectsthey
evoke. Previous studies provide support for this claim by showing
that the presentation of action effects primes activation in corre-
sponding motor structures. However, whether people actually
use action-effect representations to control their motor behavior
is not yet clear. In our fMRI study, we had participants prepare
for manual or facial actions on a trial-by-trial basis, and hypothe-
sized that preparation would bemediated bythe cortical areas that
code for the perceptual effects of these actions. Preparing for
manual action induced higher activation of hand-related areas of
motor cortex (demonstrating actual preparation) and of the extra-
striate body area, which is known to mediate the perception of
body parts. In contrast, preparing for facial action induced higher
activation of face-related motor areas and of the fusiform face
area, known to mediate face perception. These observations pro-
vide further support for the ideomotor theory and suggest that
visual imagery might play a role in voluntary action control. ■
INTRODUCTION
While acquiring new dance moves in dancing school, we
tend to prepare what to do with our feet by evoking visual
imagesofhowthefeetshouldbepositionedontheground
after each step and how they should move from there. In
fact, it is common practice in dancing schools to use foot
stamp pictures in order to visualize, and help imagining
the goal of each novel step movement. This is an everyday
example of what has been described by ideomotor theory
first developed in the late 19th century (James, 1890/1981;
Münsterberg, 1888; Harless, 1861; Lotze, 1852). The core
assumption of ideomotor theory holds that functional
anticipations of action effects play a crucial role in action
control. Lotze (1852), for instance, stated that the image of
the intended event (“Vorstellung des Gewollten,” p. 301)
serves as a kind of retrieval cue and mental access point
for the movement itself—the executing motor program,
that is. As we have no direct control over the particularities
of the actions in terms of specific muscle fibers, based on
the assumption, we use representations of the intended
outcome of actions—in our example, the visual image of
the optimal foot positions on the ground—to control and
guide our behavior.
The general idea that imagery plays a role in action con-
trol is widely spread in the literature (Jeannerod, 1999;
Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 1997), and recent work has
revived and elaborated on ideomotor theory in order
to make specific predictions that can be applied, among
other things, to neuroimaging (Elsner & Hommel, 2001;
Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Prinz,
1997; Hommel, 1996). The assumption is that sensory
systems and motor systems are connected by means of a
common codingsystemthatrepresentsperceivedandpro-
ducedeventsinterms of sensorimotorunits or“event files”
(Hommel, 1998). Due to frequent co-occurrence of ac-
tions and their perceptual consequences (e.g., visual im-
pressions of the moving hand, the motion of the key it
operates, and the light bulb being turned on by that ac-
tion), codes of actions and their sensory effects are bound
together. As the emerging association is assumed to be
bidirectional, reactivating the sensory codes representing
the light flash, say, by actively imagining the bright lamp,
spreads to the associated motor program so that this pro-
gram is under voluntary control.
Evidence supporting this scenario is available from a
number of recent neuroimaging studies. A first positron
emission tomography study by Elsner et al. (2002) had
participants carry out left and right keypresses that pro-
duced high- and low-pitched sounds. Thereafter, partici-
pants were performing a passive sound-detection task in
the scanner, during which they were presented with vari-
ous ratios of neutral and previously acquired action-effect
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a selective effect on the activation of the caudal supple-
mentary motor area and the right hippocampus, suggesting
that the latter links sensory representations of action con-
sequences to the corresponding motor programs organized
by the former. These observations were confirmed and
extended in a recent fMRI study of Melcher, Weidema,
Eenhuistra, Hommel, and Gruber (2008). Further support
comes from a study that used fMRI to compare tone-
inducedbrainactivationinprofessionalpianistsandnonmu-
sicians (Bangert et al., 2006). As comparedto nonmusicians,
the musicians showed increased activation of a cortical
sensorimotor network even in a passive listening task, sug-
gestingthattheactivationoftonerepresentationsspreadsto
apparentlyassociatedmotorstructures.Similarobservations
have been made in professional dancers, where dance-
specific motor structures are activated when participants
watched dance movies and had to evaluate how tiring those
dances were (Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grezes, Passingham, &
Haggard, 2005; for a broader overview, see Molnar-Szakacs
& Overy, 2006), and in nonmusicians after modest amounts
of piano training (McNamara et al., 2008).
Although the findings of these studies are encouraging,
they support ideomotor theory in rather indirect ways. On
one hand, they do suggest the existence of bindings be-
tween motor structures and sensory representations of
action consequences, and they support the idea that these
bindings are bidirectional and can thus propagate activation
in either way: from motor to sensory, as when experiencing
the relationship between actions and their consequences,
and from sensory to motor, as in the mentioned studies.
Onthe other hand, however, these observations donotnec-
essarily require that people are actually using representa-
tions of action consequences for controlling their actions.
Thus, even though action-effect associations may provide
a retrieval and access cue to motor programs, people may
retrieve and access motor programs along different routes.
To assess this possibility, we, in the present study, did
not present action effects in order to prime motor struc-
tures but, instead, had people prepare for actions that
would lead to different kinds of sensory consequences,
and tested whether this would activate the neural struc-
tures representing these consequences. In particular, we
compared the neural activation involved in preparing for
a manual action to the activation involved in preparing
for a facial action. We reasoned that at least some of the
sensory consequences of manual actions would be pro-
cessed by extrastriate body area (EBA) located in the pos-
terior inferior temporal sulcus. EBA has originally been
assumed to be dedicated to the processing of visual infor-
mation about other peopleʼs nonfacial body parts (Urgesi,
Berlucchi, & Aglioti, 2004; Downing, Jiang, Shuman, &
Kanwisher, 2001). Lately, it has been shown that fusiform
body area (FBA) is more responsive to the visual appear-
ance of the whole body, whereas EBA is responsive to
parts of the body (Taylor, Wiggett, & Downing, 2007).
Moreover, recent observation of EBA activity during the
executionofself-performedlimbmotoractions(Astafiev,
Stanley, Shulman, & Corbetta, 2004) suggests that EBA
also represents oneʼs own body parts; whereas a recent
study refined this finding by showing that activity in EBA
does not allow to differentiate between recognition of
familiar or unfamiliar bodies (Hodzic, Muckli, Singer, &
Stirn, 2009).Giventhatmanualactionresults,amongother
things, in the self-perception of oneʼs body parts, it thus
makes sense to assume that the EBA codes for some of
the previously experienced and now to be expected effects
of manual actions. If so, activating a manual action in the
process of preparing it for later execution should be me-
diated by EBA activity.
Along the same lines, we speculated that at least some
of the sensory consequences of facial actions would be
processed by fusiform face area (FFA) located on the lat-
eral fusiform gyrus. This area was originally assumed to
mediatetheperceptionofotherpeopleʼsfaces(Kanwisher,
McDermott, & Chun, 1997), but it may just as well code
for oneʼs own face, and thus, mediate the perception of
the sensory consequences of moving it. One might argue
that people are much more familiar with kinesthetic than
visual feedback from their own actions, so that kinesthetic
representations of action effects should be more strongly
involved in facial action control than visual representa-
tions. And yet, there is evidence of particularly strong
(Heyes, 2001), presumably even prenatal (Meltzoff &
Moore,1977,1997)intermodalconnectionsbetweenkines-
thetic, visual, and motor representations of facial move-
ments, which render it likely that preparing a facial action
involves visual codes in FFA as well.
To summarize, we expected that preparing for manual
or facial action would be mediated by the brain areas that
code for the perceptual consequences of these actions,
such as EBA and FFA, respectively. We thus had participants
carry out a binary-choice task, in which they carried out one
of two possible manual actions (a keypress with the right or
left hand) or one of two facial actions (a smiling or a kiss-
ing movement) to the (red or green) color of a visual target
stimulus (see Figure 1). The mapping of colors to the in-
dividual action alternatives was constant across the whole
experiment, but whether a manual action or a facial action
was required varied randomly from trial to trial. To signal
t h et y p eo fa c t i o nf o rt h eu p c o m i n gt r i a l ,p a r t i c i p a n t sw e r e
presented with a cue (the letter X or O) that indicated the
action modality. We assumed that participants would use
the cue to prepare for manual or facial action, and we con-
sidered the preparation to take place between the cue pre-
sentation and the presentation of the color stimulus. Given
that we were interested only in the anticipatory activation
of EBA and FFA (rather than the on-line processing of body
or face feedback during the execution of the action), we
restricted our analysis to this preparation period.
Previous studies suggest that people prepare for the selec-
tion of an action from a small response set by preactivating
all alternative actions and keeping them concurrently ac-
tive until eventual response selection (Lépine, Glencross,
Kühn et al. 215& Requin, 1989; Heuer, 1986), but use a more piecemeal
action-planning process when dealing with larger response
sets (Rosenbaum, 1980). To allow for concurrent prepa-
ration, we therefore employed very small response sets of
two alternatives per action type. To preactivate the two
alternativesbelonging to the precued type ofaction, partic-
ipants would thus be likely to access and prime the corre-
sponding action representations (in turn or concurrently)
during the analyzed interval between action cue and color
target. According to ideomotor theory, this access would
be mediated by the perceptual representations of the ac-
tion effects, which should increase the activation in EBA
with manual preparation and in FFA for facial preparation.
METHODS
Participants
We recruited 12 healthy volunteers (10 women and 2 men;
age: mean = 22.3 years, range = 18–27 years) from whom
we obtained written consent prior to the scanning session.
The study was approved by the local ethical committee.
All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. No
subject had a history of neurological, major medical, or
psychiatric disorder. All participants reported to be right-
handed. We had to exclude one participant due to a tech-
nical failure during the localizer task.
Behavioral Task
The experimental procedure consisted of a paradigm com-
prising a cue and a target stimulus (Figure 1A). The letter
cue (an X or O) was presented for 1000 msec; one letter
instructed participants to respond manually to the follow-
ing target, whereas the other letter indicated a facial action
(see Figure 1B for one of the possible mappings). After a
blank screen of 2000 to 5000 msec duration (which varied
in steps of 500 msec), the target that specified the action
alternative appeared for 1000 msec. Trial-to-trial transitions
and cue-to-target transitions were counterbalanced across
the experiment. The two possible manual actions were
button presses with the right or left index finger. The pos-
sible face actions were either uncompressing the lips into
a broad smile and raising both eyebrows, or compressing
the lips into a kiss and lowering the eyebrows (Figure 1B).
Both types of actions were speeded as fast responding was
encouraged, but due to the difficulty to measure the facial
responses, we measured reaction times for the manual
actions only. The cue–task and target–response mappings
were balanced across participants. The intertrial interval
consisted of a variable oversampling interval between
2000 and 5000 msec to obtain an interpolated temporal res-
olution of 500 msec. The experiment consisted of 80 trials
and lasted 12 min.
After the experimental session, we employed a localizer
taskduringwhichparticipantshadtopassivelyviewpictures
ofhands,faces,andtheirownface(Figure2).Weusedeight
different male and female black-and-white photographs
as well as eight different black-and-white photographs of
hands. For the own-face condition, we asked participants
to bring a photograph of themselves. All images were ad-
j u s t e dt oa s s u r et h es a m ea v e r a g el u m i n a n c e .T h ei n t e r t r i a l
interval varied as above in 500-msec steps between 2000
and 5000 msec. The localizer consisted of 120 trials with a
duration of 9 min.
Scanning Procedure
Images were collected with a 3-T Philips Achieva MRI scanner
system (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands).
First, high-resolution anatomical images were acquired
Figure 1. (A) Schematic
drawing of the experimental
trial sequence. (B) Drawing of
the cue and target mapping.
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0.88 × 1.2 mm
3). Whole-brain functional images were
collected using a T2*-weighted SENSE parallel EPI se-
quence sensitive to BOLD contrast (TR = 2211 msec,
TE = 30 msec, image matrix = 80 × 80, FOV = 220 mm, flip
angle = 80°, voxel size 2.75 × 2.75 × 2.75 mm
3, 38 axial
slices). Three hundred fifty-five image volumes were ac-
quired for the experimental run and 255 for the localizer
run, all aligned to the anterior and posterior commissures.
fMRI Data Preprocessing and Main Analysis
The fMRI data were analyzed using SPM5 software (Well-
come Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK).
The first four volumes of all EPI series were excluded
from the analysis to allow the magnetization to approach
a dynamic equilibrium. Data processing started with slice
time correction and realignment of the EPI datasets. A
mean image for all EPI volumes was created, to which
individual volumes were spatially realigned by means of
rigid-body transformations. The high-resolution struc-
tural image was coregistered with the mean image of
the EPI series. Then the structural image was normalized
to the Montreal Neurological Institute template, and the
normalization parameters were applied to the EPI im-
ages to ensure an anatomically informed normalization.
During normalization, the anatomy image volumes were
interpolated to 1 × 1 × 1 mm
3. A commonly applied spa-
tial filter of 8 mm FWHM was used on the EPI scans. Low-
frequency drifts in the time domain were removed by
modeling the time series for each voxel using a set of dis-
crete cosine functions to which a cutoff of 128 sec was
applied. Subject-level statistical analyses were performed
using the general linear model. We modeled face and
hand preparation cues as well as the face and hand tar-
gets. The main events of interest were the periods of
hand and face preparation in the experimental run and
the hand and face related activity in the localizer run.
Vectors containing the event onsets were convolved with
the canonical hemodynamic response function to form
the main regressors in the design matrix (the regression
model). Temporal derivatives, the regressors, and regres-
sors accounting for variance associated with head motion
were also entered into the model. The statistical param-
eter estimates were computed separately for each voxel
for all columns in the design matrix. Contrast images were
constructed from each individual to compare the relevant
parameter estimates for the regressors containing the
canonical hemodynamic response function. A group-level
random effects analysis was then performed using one-
sample t tests for each voxel of the contrast images.
The resulting statistical values were thresholded at p <
.001 (z > 3.09, uncorrected), with a volume greater than
350 mm
3 (10 adjacent voxels).
For the signal change analysis, we defined ROIs con-
sisting of the peak voxels and a surrounding sphere with
a radius of 6 mm for each participant individually.
1 Two
ROIs were defined in bilateral EBA resulting from the
whole-brain contrast of the hand localizer > baseline of
each participant. We defined the EBA ROIs as the peak
voxels in lateral occipito-temporal cortex of each partici-
pant based on coordinates of previous studies (Peelen &
Downing, 2005; Downing et al., 2001) [left EBA: −49
−72 −2( m e a nSD = 5); right EBA: 45 −75 −1 (mean
Figure 2. Schematic drawing
of the localizer trial sequence
and the extracted individual
regions of interest (ROIs) in
EBA and FFA.
Kühn et al. 217SD = 4)]. Furthermore, we defined an ROI in the bilateral
FFA resulting from the whole-brain contrast of the face
localizer > baseline of each subject. We defined the FFA
ROIs of each participant as the peak voxels in the fusi-
formgyrusbasedoncoordinatesofpreviousstudies (Haxby
et al., 1999; Kanwisher et al., 1997) [left FFA: −41 −59 −18
(meanSD=5);rightFFA :39−59−19(meanSD=4)](Fig-
ure 2). All individual contrasts were thresholded at p <
.001 (z > 3.09, uncorrected), with a volume greater than
175 mm
3 (5 adjacent voxels). Additionally, we used the
target phase to obtain ROIs in hand motor cortex (hand
MC; hand target > face target; left hand motor cortex:
−39 −28 58; right hand motor cortex: 34 −28 61; BA 4a
according to Eickhoff et al., 2005) and face motor cortex
(face MC; face target > hand target; left face motor cortex:
−55 −9 47; right face motor cortex: 55 −84 7 ;B A1a c c o r d -
ing to Eickhoff et al., 2005; BA 4 using Talairach Daemon,
Lancaster et al., 2000) on the group level. For each subject,
region, and condition, the mean percent signal change of
hand and face preparation over a time window of 6–8s e c
after cue onset was calculated separately and compared
by means of 2 × 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA with
the factors ROI, ROI side (left vs. right), and preparation
(face vs. hand).
RESULTS
Behavioral Data
A repeated measure ANOVA on manual reaction times re-
vealed a significant main effect of cue–target interval [CTI
2000: 597 msec; CTI 2500: 558 msec; CTI 3000: 543 msec;
CTI 3500: 519 msec; CTI 4000: 516 msec; CTI 4500:
512 msec; CTI 5000: 517 msec; F(1, 10) = 2.44, p <. 0 5 ] ,
indicating that longer CTIs allow for more extensive re-
sponse preparation.
fMRI Data
In order to explore the neural correlates of preparation in
specific brain areas, we focused on specific hand and face
action preparation in hand and face motor cortex first.
A percent signal change analysis on bilateral motor cortex
(MC) ROIs taken from the target phase (a sphere with a
radius of 6 mm around the peak voxel of a group-level
analysis in face and hand MC) showed a significant inter-
action of ROI location (hand MC vs. face MC) and prepara-
tion (hand vs. face) [Figure 3; F(1, 10) = 17.13, p <. 0 1 ] .
Post hoc paired t tests revealed significant differences
between hand and face preparation in hand motor cortex
[t(10) = 4.25, p < .01] and a marginally significant differ-
ence between hand and face preparation in face motor
cortex [t(10) = 2.18, p = .054]. The lower reliability of
the latter difference could result from a greater variability
in face motor cortex activation between participants due
to less training in responding with the face and due to in-
creased head movement during facial responding. Overall,
the result indicates that the action-modality cues (in par-
ticular, the hand cue) were used to actively prepare for
the type of action afforded in the upcoming trial, even
though theindividual actionalternativewas not yet known.
Based on the ideomotor theory, we predicted that ac-
tion preparation is mediated by activating perceptual rep-
resentations of the associated action effects, which we
assume to be coded in EBA for manual movements and
FFA for facial movements. Indeed, a percent signal change
analysis on brain areas involved in the perception of hands
and faces during the localizer task showed a significant in-
teraction of ROI location (EBA vs. FFA) and prepared ac-
tion modality (hand vs. face) [Figure 4; F(1, 10) = 36.37,
p < .001]. Post hoc paired t tests revealed significant differ-
ences between face and hand preparation in FFA [t(10) =
6.37, p < .001]as well as in EBA[t(10) = −3.85, p <. 0 1 ] .A
Figure 3. Percent signal changes of ROIs in bilateral hand motor cortex
(sphere with radius 6 mm around the group peak voxel of the contrast
hand target vs. face target) and face motor cortex (sphere with radius
6 mm around the group peak voxel of the contrast face target vs.
hand target). Error bars depict standard error of the mean.
Figure 4. Percent signal changes of ROIs in bilateral EBA (sphere
with radius 6 mm around individual peak voxel of the contrast hand
localizer vs. baseline) and FFA (sphere with radius 6 mm around
individual peak voxel of the contrast face localizer vs. baseline).
Error bars depict standard error of the mean.
218 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 23, Number 1similar result is obtained on ROIs based on the contrast
own face > baseline [F(1, 10) = 25.23, p < .01]. This inter-
action clearly supports the prediction of ideomotor theory
that the perceptual representation of the effectors plays a
role in the preparation of effector-specific movements.
DISCUSSION
The major aim of our study was to assess the basic assump-
tion of the ideomotor theory that voluntarymovements are
accessed by anticipating their perceivable effects (James,
1890/1981; Münsterberg, 1888; Harless, 1861; Lotze,
1852). If activating an action is mediated by codes of their
effects, as wereasoned, then preparing for a particular type
of action should lead to the activation of brain areas that
a r ec o d i n gf o rt h e s ea c t i o n s ʼ perceptual consequences.
Participants were asked to prepare for manual or facial ac-
tions, which we assumed would involve the activation of
EBA and FFA, respectively. This is exactly what the findings
show: Manual preparation did not only involve increased
activation of hand-related areas of the motor cortex but
also increased activation in EBA, whereas facial preparation
involved increased activation in face-related motor areas
and FFA. Accordingly, we take the outcome of this study
as further support of the ideomotor theory.
Moreover, our study suggests that both EBA and FFA
play a role in the representation of oneʼs own body (cf.,
Berlucchi & Aglioti, 1997) and in the control of voluntary
action. This stands in contrast to recent studies suggesting
that body form is represented in EBA but processing of
body actions is related to ventral premotor cortex (Moro
et al., 2008; Urgesi, Candidi, Ionta, & Aglioti, 2007). How-
ever, in contrast to our approach, these studies explored
how body stimuli are processed when focusing on the
form or the action, but not whether voluntary action may
involve the visual imagery of the goal. We aimed to demon-
strate that in order to set up an action to reach a particular
goal, people may activate the representations of those ac-
tion effects that match this goal, and that this activation
spreads to the motor actions associated with these repre-
sentations. For instance, planning a hand-reaching action
would involve the activation of the perceptual representa-
tionof theintendedeffectorand,perhaps,itsintendedend
state (cf., Rosenbaum et al., 1990), which then activates
those motor patterns that were leading to perceptions of
this effector and this end state in the past. The motor pat-
terns are likely to be organized via the supplementary
motor area and may be linked via the hippocampus to
action-effect representations in EBA, FFA, and elsewhere
(Melcher et al., 2008; Elsner et al., 2002).
On one hand, the evidence provided by our present
study can be considered more direct than previous dem-
onstrations that motor structures are activated by the pre-
sentation of action effects (McNamara et al., 2008; Melcher
et al., 2008; Bangert et al., 2006; Elsner et al., 2002). These
demonstrations indicate the existence of bidirectional as-
sociations between motor programs and sensory action-
effect representations, but they do not show that action
effects are activated in the course of action planning. Our
present study does provide this evidence: Planning an ac-
tion indeed involves the activation of the neural codes of
sensory action effects. On the other hand, however, our
observation is still correlational in showing that motor prep-
aration and action-effect activation co-occur, without indi-
cating whether effect activation was necessary or sufficient
for successful action preparation. To determine whether
the relationship between motor preparation and action-
effect activation is causal, it would be necessary to test
whether motor preparation is possible if effect activation is
prevented (e.g., by means of TMS or natural lesions). In a
recent rTMS study, the reverse of the bidirectional binding
demonstrated here has been shown in a facial expressions
discrimination task (Pitcher, Garrido, Walsh, & Duchaine,
2008): When participants received rTMS on the face region
of right somatosensory cortex, their task performance was
impaired, suggesting a necessity of somatovisceral simula-
tion in order to perceive facial expressions.
Acknowledgments
The work was supported by a post-doc grant of the Research
Foundation-Flanders (FWO-Vlaanderen) awarded to the first
author.
Reprint requests should be sent to Simone Kühn, Department of
Experimental Psychology, University of Ghent, Henri Dunantlaan
2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium, or via e-mail: simone.kuhn@ugent.be.
Note
1. We also considered the temporal dynamics (time lines) of the
BOLD signal. However, due to the fact that the task cue deter-
mines no more than the earliest possible time point of selective
action preparation, but not necessarily the actual starting point of
the preparation process (which is likely to vary considerably both
intra- and interindividually), the signal is smeared over time and
turned out to be not very informative.
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